基于竞价的租赁车辆资源分配和定价机制

doi:10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2018010234

计算机应用 ›› 2018, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (8): 2423-2430.DOI: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2018010234

• 应用前沿、交叉与综合 • 上一篇下一篇

基于竞价的租赁车辆资源分配和定价机制

刘旭东¹, 张学杰¹, 张骥先¹, 李伟东², 张静¹

1. 云南大学信息学院, 昆明 650500;
2. 云南大学数学与统计学院, 昆明 650500

收稿日期:2018-01-26 修回日期:2018-03-31 出版日期:2018-08-10 发布日期:2018-08-11
通讯作者: 张骥先
作者简介:刘旭东(1991-),男,内蒙古包头人,硕士研究生,CCF会员,主要研究方向:云计算、拍卖机制设计;张学杰(1965-),男,云南昆明人,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:高性能计算、可重构计算;张骥先(1980-),男,云南昆明人,讲师,博士,主要研究方向:分布式系统、云计算;李伟东(1981-),男,云南昆明人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向:组合优化和算法博弈论;张静(1993-),女,云南昆明人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:云计算、拍卖机制设计。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（61472345，61762091）；云南省教育厅科学研究基金资助项目（2017ZZX228）。

Auction based vehicle resource allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental

LIU Xudong¹, ZHANG Xuejie¹, ZHANG Jixian¹, LI Weidong², ZHANG Jing¹

1. School of Information Science and Engineering, Yunnan University, Kunming Yunnan 650500, China;
2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming Yunnan 650500, China

Received:2018-01-26 Revised:2018-03-31 Online:2018-08-10 Published:2018-08-11
Supported by:
This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61472345, 61762091), the Scientic Research Foundation of Yunnan Provincial Department of Education (2017ZZX228).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对目前线上汽车租赁平台使用固定价格的方式来租赁车辆给用户，存在着租赁车辆分配不合理、定价不能及时反映真实的市场供需情况、整体社会福利较低等问题，提出一种基于竞价的租赁车辆分配与定价机制。首先，研究了线上汽车租赁问题模型，抽象出数学模型与社会福利最大目标函数；然后，在租赁车辆分配算法中采用基于最小费用最大流算法的最优化车辆资源分配算法；最后，在价格支付算法中采用了可信的VCG价格算法，计算出用户最终的支付价格。对比传统的先来先服务算法，基于竞价的租赁车辆分配与定价机制在订单成功率方面提升了20%~30%，在平台收益方面增加了30%左右。实验结果表明，所提出的机制具有车辆分配最优化、弹性价格的优势。

关键词: 共享经济, 线上汽车租赁, 车辆资源分配, 竞价机制, 社会福利, VCG定价机制

Abstract: Since the vehicles provided by current online car rental platforms are in the fixed price, there are some issues coming up such as unreasonable allocation of the vehicle resources, unreliable price that could not indicates the real market supply and demand timely, and generally low social welfare. Therefore, an auction based vehicle allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental was proposed. Firstly, a mathematical model and a social welfare maximization objective function were established by studying the model of online car rental issues. Secondly, based on the minimum cost and maximum flow algorithm, the optimal vehicle resource allocation algorithm was adopted among the rental vehicle allocation algorithms. Finally, in terms of the price calculation algorithms, a truthful VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) price algorithm was used to calculate the final price. As a result, compared with the traditional first-come-first-serving algorithms, the order success rate of the proposed scheme was increased by 20% to 30%, and the revenue was increased by about 30%. Theoretical analysis and experiment results show that the proposed mechanism has the advantages of optimizing vehicle allocation and flexible price strategy.

Key words: sharing economy, online car rental, vehicle resource allocation, auction mechanism, social welfare, VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) pricing mechanism

中图分类号:

TP302

刘旭东, 张学杰, 张骥先, 李伟东, 张静. 基于竞价的租赁车辆资源分配和定价机制[J]. 计算机应用, 2018, 38(8): 2423-2430.

LIU Xudong, ZHANG Xuejie, ZHANG Jixian, LI Weidong, ZHANG Jing. Auction based vehicle resource allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental[J]. Journal of Computer Applications, 2018, 38(8): 2423-2430.

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基于竞价的租赁车辆资源分配和定价机制

Auction based vehicle resource allocation and pricing mechanism for car rental

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