Journal of Computer Applications ›› 2011, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (05): 1159-1161.DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1087.2011.01159

• Network and communications •     Next Articles

Analysis of cooperation model for P2P live streaming in game theoretic framework

CHENG Pu1,2,CHU Yan-ping1,DU Ying3   

  1. 1. Computer Center, Henan University, Kaifeng Henan 475004, China
    2. Software Engineering Institute, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China
    3. College of Computer and Information Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng Henan 475004, China
  • Received:2010-10-22 Revised:2010-12-16 Online:2011-05-01 Published:2011-05-01
  • Contact: CHENG Pu

博弈论框架下P2P实时流的合作模型研究

程普1,2,楚艳萍1,杜莹3   

  1. 1. 河南大学 计算中心,河南 开封 475004
    2. 华东师范大学 软件学院,上海 200062
    3. 河南大学 计算机与信息工程学院,河南 开封475004
  • 通讯作者: 程普
  • 作者简介:程普(1981-),男,河南息县人,助教,博士研究生,主要研究方向:P2P、无线传感网; 楚艳萍(1971-),女,河南叶县人,副教授,硕士,主要研究方向:计算机网络通信; 杜莹(1981-),女,河南息县人,讲师,硕士,主要研究方向:自然语言理解、软件工程。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(61004006)

Abstract: To resolve the problem of "free riding" and "tragedy of the commons" in peer-to-peer live streaming systems, a cooperation model was proposed in a game theoretic framework. The proportional fairness optimal strategy was proved under Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. And then the corresponding node behavior strategy was analyzed considering their cheating behaviors. Finally, the analytical results show that the model can effectively stimulate node cooperation and prevent cheating.

Key words: Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, game theory, incentive mechanism, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality

摘要: 针对P2P实时流环境中出现的“搭便车”和“公共悲剧”问题,提出一种博弈论框架下的激励合作模型。分析该模型达到Nash均衡和Pareto最优状态下对应的比例公平策略优化。并考虑存在欺骗行为的情况,研究对应的节点行为策略。理论分析表明,该模型能够刺激节点合作,并且对节点的欺骗行为具有抑制作用。

关键词: 对等网络, 博弈论, 激励机制, Nash均衡, Pareto最优