KLEIN has experienced attacks such as truncated difference cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis since it was proposed. Its encryption structure has actual security， but the vulnerability of the key expansion algorithm leads to full-round key recovery attacks. Firstly， the key expansion algorithm was modified and an improved algorithm N-KLEIN was proposed. Secondly， an efficient quantum circuit was implemented on the S-box using the in-place method， which reduced the width and depth of the circuit and improved the implementation efficiency of the quantum circuit. Thirdly， the quantization of obfuscation operations was achieved using LUP decomposition technology. Then， an efficient quantum circuit was designed for N-KLEIN， and an efficient quantum circuit for all round N-KLEIN was proposed. Finally， the resource occupation for the quantum implementation of full-round N-KLEIN was evaluated and compared with the resources occupied by existing quantum implementations of lightweight block ciphers such as PRESENT and HIGHT. At the same time， an in-depth study was conducted on the cost of key search attacks based on Grover algorithm， and the cost of N-KLEIN-｛64，80，96｝ using Grover algorithm to search for keys under the Clifford+T model was given， and then the quantum security of N-KLEIN was evaluated. Comparative results indicate that the quantum implementation cost of N-KLEIN algorithm is significantly lower.

The rapid development of quantum technology and the continuous improvement of quantum computing efficiency， especially the emergence of Shor algorithm and Grover algorithm， greatly threaten the security of traditional public key cipher and symmetric cipher. The block cipher PFP algorithm designed based on Feistel structure was analyzed. First， the linear transformation P of the round function was fused into the periodic functions in the Feistel structure， then four 5-round periodic functions of PFP were obtained， two rounds more than periodic functions in general Feistel structure， which was verified through experiments. Furthermore， by using quantum Grover and Simon algorithms， with a 5-round periodic function as the distinguisher， the security of 9， 10-round PFP was evaluated by analyzing the characteristics of PFP key arrangement algorithm. The time complexity required for key recovery is 2²⁶， 2^38.5， the quantum resource required is 193， 212 qubits， and the 58， 77 bits key can be restored， which are superior to the existing impossible differential analysis results.

Symmetric cryptography is the core technology of data confidentiality in information systems. At the same time， nonlinear S-box is usually the key cryptographic component， and is widely used in the design of block cipher， stream cipher， MAC （Message Authentication Code） algorithm， etc. In order to ensure the security of the cryptographic algorithm design， firstly， the criteria testing methods for differential uniformity， nonlinearity， fixed point number， algebraic degree and item number， algebraic immunity， avalanche characteristic and diffusion characteristic were researched. Secondly， the results of each security criterion of the S-box were designed and output in the visual window， and the detailed descriptions of the corresponding security criterion were given in a pop-up window way. Thirdly， the design of the sub-components of nonlinearity and algebraic immunity was focused， and the linear distribution table was simplified according to the nonlinearity. At the same time， based on the theorem， the calculation process of algebraic immunity was optimized and illustrated with an example. Finally， the S-box testing tool was implemented with seven security criteria， and the test cases were demonstrated. The proposed tool is mainly used to test the security criteria of the nonlinear component S-box in the symmetric cryptographic algorithm， and then provides a guarantee for the security of the overall algorithm.