Abstract: Aiming at the problem of huge losses caused by untimely and inactive emergency rescue information sharing in emergencies， a three-party game model of emergency rescue information sharing involving high-risk enterprises， rescue teams and government regulatory departments was established. Firstly， the payoff matrix and replicated dynamic equations were constructed based on the revenue. Then， stability analysis was performed for four different scenarios respectively. Finally， the evolution processes and results of the system under different scenarios were simulated through computer to obtain the optimal strategies for information sharing. Experimental results show that under the low benefit scenario， if the extra rewards and punishments are high， the willingness of emergency rescue teams to actively share rises to 0.2 and then gradually decreases until they reject information sharing completely； if the extra cost is high， the willingness of high-risk enterprises to actively share rises to about 0.2 and then rapidly decreases to 0. Meanwhile， the behavioral strategies of participants are most sensitive to the changes of positive benefit， then to the changes in extra rewards and punishments and extra costs. The above results can provide guidance for the selection of information sharing strategies in emergency response.

Key words: emergency rescue, evolutionary game, information sharing, government participation, computer simulation

摘要： 针对突发事件中应急救援信息共享不及时、不积极带来巨大损失的问题，建立了高危企业、救援队伍、政府监管部门参与的应急救援信息共享三方博弈模型。首先，根据收益情况构建支付矩阵与复制动态方程；然后，分别对4个不同场景进行稳定性分析；最后，通过计算机仿真模拟不同场景下系统的演化过程与结果，从而得到信息共享的最优策略。实验结果表明：在收益较低的情况下，若额外奖惩高，则应急救援队伍积极共享的意愿升至0.2，随后逐渐降低，直至完全拒绝信息共享；若额外成本较高，则高危企业积极共享的意愿升至0.2左右，随后快速降低至0。同时，参与者的行为策略对正向收益的变化表现得最为敏感，对额外奖惩、额外成本变化的敏感性次之。以上结果可为应急救援中的信息共享策略选择提供指导性意见。

关键词: 应急救援, 演化博弈, 信息共享, 政府参与, 计算机仿真