Abstract: Designated Verifier Signature (DVS) eliminates the publicly verifiable feature of traditional digital signature to prevent a verifier from proving to a third party the fact that a particular digital signature held by him is issued by a signer. Traditionally, security of digital signature schemes relies on the ideal assumption that an adversary has no access to the information of a secret key. However, side-channel attacks show that the physical implementation of a cryptographic algorithm will leak partial secret information to an adversary. Hence it is necessary to design a leakage-resilient designated verifier signature. Okamoto authentication scheme was converted into a designated verifier signature scheme by using the OR proof technique. Given the leakage bound, the security of the presented scheme was proved under the relative leakage model.

Key words: Designated Verifier Signature (DVS), side-channel attack, relative leakage model, public verifiability, digital signature

摘要： 指定验证者签名(DVS)克服了传统的数字签名中可公开验证的缺点，可防止验证者向第三方表明他获得了签名方发布的数字签名。但传统的密码方案的安全性依赖理想的假设，即攻击者不能获得保密的密钥的信息,而边信道攻击表明攻击者可以获得部分的秘密信息,因此有必要设计可以容忍信息泄露的指定验证者签名方案。基于“或”证明的技术，把Okamoto认证方案推广到指定验证者签名的情形,并在给定的泄露界下,证明了所提出的指定验证者签名方案在相对泄露模型下是安全的。

关键词: 指定验证者签名, 边信道攻击, 相对泄露模型, 公开验证, 数字签名