Journal of Computer Applications ›› 2021, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (6): 1785-1791.DOI: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2020091449

Special Issue: 前沿与综合应用

• Frontier and comprehensive applications • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Knowledge sharing behavior incentive mechanism for lead users based on evolutionary game

LI Congdong1,2, HUANG Hao1, ZHANG Fanshun1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou Guangdong 510632, China;
    2. Institute of Internet of Things and Logistic Engineering, Jinan University, Zhuhai Guangdong 519070, China
  • Received:2020-09-17 Revised:2020-10-30 Online:2021-06-10 Published:2020-11-20
  • Supported by:
    This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71672074, 72072072).


李从东1,2, 黄浩1, 张帆顺1   

  1. 1. 暨南大学 管理学院, 广州 510632;
    2. 暨南大学 物联网与物流工程研究院, 广东 珠海 519070
  • 通讯作者: 黄浩
  • 作者简介:李从东(1962-),男,山西大同人,教授,博士,主要研究方向:产品创新管理、知识管理;黄浩(1997-),男,重庆人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向:知识管理;张帆顺(1994-),男,湖南长沙人,博士研究生,主要研究方向:产品创新管理。
  • 基金资助:

Abstract: The user innovation community does not consider the impact of incentive mechanism of enterprise on the knowledge sharing behavior of lead users. In order to solve the problem, a new knowledge sharing behavior incentive mechanism for lead users based on evolutionary game was proposed. Firstly, the enterprise and lead users were regarded as the main players of the evolutionary game, and the models under the conditions that the enterprise did not adopt incentive measures and the enterprise adopted incentive measures were constructed respectively. Then, to explore the dynamic evolution process and evolutionary stable strategy of the system, the local stability analysis was performed to the two models respectively. Finally, through the computer simulation, the evolution results of knowledge sharing under the two conditions were compared, and the influence factors and the best incentive strategy of the knowledge sharing behavior of lead users were analyzed. Experimental results show that, the enterprise taking incentive measures can effectively promote the knowledge sharing behavior of lead users, and when the incentive distribution coefficient is controlled within a certain range, the system will reach the best stable state; the optimal incentive distribution coefficient is determined by knowledge sharing cost, knowledge search cost and additional cost; the knowledge sharing cost, knowledge search cost and incentive distribution coefficient can significantly influence the level of knowledge sharing behavior of lead users.

Key words: lead user, knowledge sharing, incentive mechanism, enterprise innovation, evolutionary game

摘要: 针对用户创新社区中未考虑企业激励机制对领先用户知识共享行为影响的问题,提出一种基于演化博弈的领先用户知识共享行为激励机制。首先,将企业和领先用户作为博弈主体,分别构建企业未采取激励措施和企业采取激励措施条件下的演化博弈模型;其次,分别对两个模型进行局部稳定性分析,以探讨系统的动态演化过程与演化稳定策略;最后,通过计算机模拟仿真,对比两种条件下领先用户知识共享行为的演化结果,分析领先用户知识共享行为的影响因素及最佳激励策略。实验结果表明,企业采取激励措施可以有效促进领先用户的知识共享行为,并且将激励分配系数控制在一定范围内时系统将达到最佳的稳定状态;最佳激励分配系数大小由知识共享成本、知识搜索成本及额外成本共同决定;知识共享成本、知识搜索成本以及激励分配系数会显著影响领先用户知识共享行为的水平。

关键词: 领先用户, 知识共享, 激励机制, 企业创新, 演化博弈

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