关键词: 以太坊经典网络, 自私挖矿, 马尔可夫链, 叔块奖励, 区块链安全

Abstract: Selfish mining disrupts the normal consensus process of blockchain networks by concealing mining and delaying the release of new blocks, leading to increased fork rates and reduced system efficiency. To quantitatively analyze the impact of selfish mining on the Ethereum Classic network under a multi-attacker environment, this paper constructs a Markov chain model with multiple attackers interacting with the network's unique uncle and nephew block reward mechanism. The model quantitatively analyzes the revenue dynamics of miners under different scenarios. Experimental results show that when the attacker's computing power reaches 0.3, a coordinated attack by two selfish mining pools increases the waste block rate from 26.35% to 36.21% and reduces the system throughput from 20.15% to 16.44%. Compared with the case of a single selfish miner, this attack strategy further increases the attacker's relative revenue while exacerbating the problems of harming honest miners' revenue, increasing the waste block rate, and decreasing system efficiency. Our results reveal the complex revenue mechanism of multi-attacker selfish mining and provide a theoretical and quantitative basis for designing targeted defense strategies.

Key words: Ethereum Classic（ETC）, selfish mining, Markov chain, uncle reward, blockchain security