《计算机应用》唯一官方网站 ›› 2024, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (7): 2123-2136.DOI: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2023070975
吴中岱1,2, 韩德志3, 蒋海豹3, 冯程3(), 韩冰1, 陈重庆3
收稿日期:
2023-07-19
修回日期:
2023-09-27
接受日期:
2023-09-27
发布日期:
2023-10-26
出版日期:
2024-07-10
通讯作者:
冯程
作者简介:
吴中岱(1976—),男,江苏无锡人,教授,博士,主要研究方向:认知无线电、异构无线网络安全传输;基金资助:
Zhongdai WU1,2, Dezhi HAN3, Haibao JIANG3, Cheng FENG3(), Bing HAN1, Chongqing CHEN3
Received:
2023-07-19
Revised:
2023-09-27
Accepted:
2023-09-27
Online:
2023-10-26
Published:
2024-07-10
Contact:
Cheng FENG
About author:
WU Zhongdai, born in 1976, Ph. D., professor. His research interests include cognitive radio, secure transmission in heterogeneous wireless networks.Supported by:
摘要:
海上运输是人类最重要的运输方式之一,海上船舶通信网络安全对一个涉海国家的经济发展至关重要。由于海上船舶通信网络基础设施建设远不如陆地互联网络基础设施建设完善,其通信网络存在很多安全漏洞,导致多起船舶在海洋航行时遭受网络攻击。近几年,国内外已有大量有关海上通信网络安全的研究文献,但缺乏海洋船舶通信网络安全研究综述文献发表。为此,针对海洋船舶通信网络结构、存在的网络安全风险及其应对安全措施等研究文献进行系统的梳理和综合讨论。在此基础上,对海上船舶通信网络安全威胁提出应对的策略和建议。
中图分类号:
吴中岱, 韩德志, 蒋海豹, 冯程, 韩冰, 陈重庆. 海洋船舶通信网络安全综述[J]. 计算机应用, 2024, 44(7): 2123-2136.
Zhongdai WU, Dezhi HAN, Haibao JIANG, Cheng FENG, Bing HAN, Chongqing CHEN. Review of marine ship communication cybersecurity[J]. Journal of Computer Applications, 2024, 44(7): 2123-2136.
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
针对海上航行采取行动,将船带到危险区域(礁石、海盗等) | • 对定位系统干扰或拒绝服务; • 攻击助航系统 |
在狭窄水域或附近采取行动,使船舶处于危险状态,如碰到障碍物或其他船舶 | • 接管或破坏船舶的控制设备(舵、推进等); • 发射错误的自动识别系统(AIS)回波; •攻击用来传达命令的内部通信网络(语音或信息) |
针对海上安全系统行动 | • 禁止或修改有关的船舶安全信息(天气、紧急通知、电子导航系统、安全警报系统等) |
针对船舶的完整性、可用性或安全性行动 | • 攻击船舶或其货物的工业或安全系统(推进、火水探测和控制系统、阀门开关等); • 恶意接管船舶监管流程和设备远程维护操作 |
针对船舶的网络安全采取行动 | • 船组人员执行IT操作中的风险行为; • 无法维持安全状况或舰载信息安全参数; • 发生计算机网络攻击时船组人员应对不良 |
降低船舶和主管部门的反应能力,以便促进恶意行为 | • 对通信系统干扰或攻击,阻止发出遇险信号 |
表1 海上网络攻击对船舶的危害
Tab. 1 Hazards of maritime cyberattacks to ships
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
针对海上航行采取行动,将船带到危险区域(礁石、海盗等) | • 对定位系统干扰或拒绝服务; • 攻击助航系统 |
在狭窄水域或附近采取行动,使船舶处于危险状态,如碰到障碍物或其他船舶 | • 接管或破坏船舶的控制设备(舵、推进等); • 发射错误的自动识别系统(AIS)回波; •攻击用来传达命令的内部通信网络(语音或信息) |
针对海上安全系统行动 | • 禁止或修改有关的船舶安全信息(天气、紧急通知、电子导航系统、安全警报系统等) |
针对船舶的完整性、可用性或安全性行动 | • 攻击船舶或其货物的工业或安全系统(推进、火水探测和控制系统、阀门开关等); • 恶意接管船舶监管流程和设备远程维护操作 |
针对船舶的网络安全采取行动 | • 船组人员执行IT操作中的风险行为; • 无法维持安全状况或舰载信息安全参数; • 发生计算机网络攻击时船组人员应对不良 |
降低船舶和主管部门的反应能力,以便促进恶意行为 | • 对通信系统干扰或攻击,阻止发出遇险信号 |
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
对基础设施的安全采取行动,这种类型的操作可以支持针对基础设施的物理攻击 | • 对港口基础系统的攻击,例如视频监视、入侵探测、访问管理、授权人员身份验证、开门命令等 |
针对港口的安全采取行动 | • 攻击工业或港口安全系统:火灾探测和灭火系统、打开危险液体或气体的阀门开关 |
对港口的运营采取行动,造成经济和声誉损失 | • 攻击导航管理和机动管理系统; • 攻击工业管理和货运装卸系统 |
表2 海上网络攻击对港口的危害
Tab. 2 Hazards of maritime cyberattacks to ports
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
对基础设施的安全采取行动,这种类型的操作可以支持针对基础设施的物理攻击 | • 对港口基础系统的攻击,例如视频监视、入侵探测、访问管理、授权人员身份验证、开门命令等 |
针对港口的安全采取行动 | • 攻击工业或港口安全系统:火灾探测和灭火系统、打开危险液体或气体的阀门开关 |
对港口的运营采取行动,造成经济和声誉损失 | • 攻击导航管理和机动管理系统; • 攻击工业管理和货运装卸系统 |
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
窃取乘客信息或货物数据进行人身攻击或盗窃 | • 攻击管理系统 |
破坏供应链,给利益相关者带来财务和信誉损失 | • 攻击连接的集装箱,以修改规定(温度等)或地理位置数据; • 攻击安全或保险工具(例如火灾或入侵探测器); • 控制货物装卸系统(油、气、化学产品等)或压载舱水管理系统等系统,以产生污染 |
通过修改、篡改或破坏数据,来隐藏旅客的真实身份,或隐藏危险或非法包裹或集装箱的真实来源和性质,以此打破海关或警察的控制 | • 攻击海关之间的传输系统; • 攻击管理系统; • 攻击集装箱的定位、可追溯性或识别系统; • 欺骗边境自动控制系统; • 攻击控制系统(危险物质扫描仪、检测仪等); • 攻击集装箱开关检测系统; • 攻击安装在集装箱上的入侵探测或警报系统 |
表3 海上网络攻击对旅客和货船的危害
Tab. 3 Hazards of maritime cyberattacks to passengers and cargo ships
影响 | 主要具体手段 |
---|---|
窃取乘客信息或货物数据进行人身攻击或盗窃 | • 攻击管理系统 |
破坏供应链,给利益相关者带来财务和信誉损失 | • 攻击连接的集装箱,以修改规定(温度等)或地理位置数据; • 攻击安全或保险工具(例如火灾或入侵探测器); • 控制货物装卸系统(油、气、化学产品等)或压载舱水管理系统等系统,以产生污染 |
通过修改、篡改或破坏数据,来隐藏旅客的真实身份,或隐藏危险或非法包裹或集装箱的真实来源和性质,以此打破海关或警察的控制 | • 攻击海关之间的传输系统; • 攻击管理系统; • 攻击集装箱的定位、可追溯性或识别系统; • 欺骗边境自动控制系统; • 攻击控制系统(危险物质扫描仪、检测仪等); • 攻击集装箱开关检测系统; • 攻击安装在集装箱上的入侵探测或警报系统 |
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