Journal of Computer Applications ›› 2019, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (6): 1824-1828.DOI: 10.11772/j.issn.1001-9081.2018102196

• Frontier & interdisciplinary applications • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary game model under synergistic effect of time scale and selection preference

WANG Xilong1,2, WANG Jicheng1, LUO Cheng1, TIAN Xiuxia2   

  1. 1. College of Electronics and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China;
    2. College of Computer Science and Technology, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200090, China
  • Received:2018-11-01 Revised:2019-01-02 Online:2019-06-17 Published:2019-06-10
  • Supported by:
    This work is partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61772327, 61532021), the Local Capacity Construction Project of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission (15110500700).


王西龙1,2, 王继成1, 罗成1, 田秀霞2   

  1. 1. 同济大学 电子与信息工程学院, 上海 200092;
    2. 上海电力学院 计算机科学与技术学院, 上海 200090
  • 通讯作者: 王继成
  • 作者简介:王西龙(1978-),女,辽宁营口人,博士研究生,主要研究方向:复杂网络、演化博弈;王继成(1958-),江苏盐城人,教授,博士,主要研究方向:数据仓库、数据挖掘、人工智能、神经网络;罗成(1986-),男,湖北襄阳人,博士,主要研究方向:数据挖掘、机器学习;田秀霞(1976-),女,河南安阳人,教授,博士,CCF会员,主要研究方向:数据库安全、隐私保护、安全机器学习。
  • 基金资助:

Abstract: Considering emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior, based on evolutionary game theory and network theory, an evolutionary game model which can promote cooperation was proposed. In the proposed model, time scale and selection preference were introduced simultaneously into evolutionary game. In initialization phase, players were segmented into two categories according to their time scales of the strategies. Players in one category updated their strategies in each round, while players in the other category determined wether to update their strategies according to certain probability after every round of game. In strategy updating phase, the reputation of a player was determined by his distribution to his neighbors, and all players perfered to learn the strategies of neighbors with good reputation. The simulation experimental results show that, in the proposed evolutionary game model under synergistic effect of time scale and selection preference, cooperative behavior can be maintained in the group, the players with inertia hinders the emergence of cooperation, but the irrational behavior of players can promote cooperation.

Key words: evolutionary game, time scale, selection preference, prisoner's dilemma, complex network

摘要: 针对合作行为的涌现与维持问题,基于演化博弈理论和网络理论,提出了一种促进合作的演化博弈模型。该模型同时将时间尺度、选择倾向性引入到演化博弈中。在初始化阶段,根据持有策略的时间尺度将个体分为两种类型:一种个体在每个时间步都进行策略更新;另一种个体在每一轮博弈后,以某种概率来决定是否进行策略更新。在策略更新阶段,模型用个体对周围邻居的贡献来表征他的声誉,并假设参与博弈的个体倾向于学习具有较好声誉邻居的策略。仿真实验结果表明,所提出的时间尺度与选择倾向性协同作用下的演化博弈模型中,合作行为能够在群体中维持;惰性个体的存在不利于合作的涌现,但是个体的非理性行为反而能够促进合作。

关键词: 演化博弈, 时间尺度, 选择倾向性, 囚徒困境, 复杂网络

CLC Number: